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9	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
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12	In re JOSEPH HUNT,) Case No.: A090435
13		PETITIONER'S REPLY TO
14	Petitioner,) INFORMAL RESPONSE)
15	On Habeas Corpus.	Dept. 70
16		The Honorable Christopher Dybwad
17)
18		,
19	TO THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER DYBWAD, JUDGE, DEPARTMENT	
20	70, WEST, AND TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE LOS ANGELES	
21	DISTRICT ATTORNEY:	
22	Petitioner Joseph Hunt hereby submits this reply to the informal response to the	
23	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.	
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. THE CLAIMS OF THE PETITION ARE NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

Respondent first argues that the instant petition is procedurally barred. (Inf. Resp., pp. 22-25.) However, Petitioner's actual innocence to the charge of robbery and the special circumstance negates any procedural bar. *In re Reno* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 (Reno); *In re Robbins* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780–781 (Robbins).) The evidence clearly establishes that Hunt is actually innocent of the crime of robbery and the robbery special circumstance, as he had a good faith belief that he had claim to the property taken (i.e. the check for \$1.5 million). (*Reno*, 55 Cal.4th at p. 460; *Robbins*, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 780-781; Petition, pp. 15-17.) Indeed, the prosecutor, through his closing argument, asserted a view of the facts which establishes that Hunt is actually innocent of robbery, had the jury properly been instructed on the relevant claim-of-right defense to robbery. (RT 12752-12753.)

II.

RESPONDENT IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM RE-LIGITATING THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

Respondent's argument in its reply is nothing more than an attempt to re-litigate the facts of the case, which it is estopped from doing. (Evid. Code § 623.)

The District Attorney, in his response to the Habeas Petitions, labors to reinterpret the facts so as to reach a view of them contrary to that of D.D.A. Fred Wapner at trial. The effort is futile. The State's representative at trial took a position on the evidence from which the State cannot retreat. The trial prosecutor told the jury that Levin and Clayton Brokerage duped Hunt into believing that he had made \$8 million in a series of legitimate and lawful trades made in Levin's brokerage account pursuant to a trading power of attorney executed in Hunt's favor. The brokerage house (colluding in bad faith to dupe Hunt) had their broker Jack Friedman falsely accept and confirm commodity futures trades -- and Clayton generated false brokerage statements which Levin

furnished Hunt. As D.D.A. Wapner remarked, Hunt actually believed he had made the money, and Levin publicly acknowledged the multimillion-dollar debt to Hunt. In all this, Hunt was blameless, a victim of fraud and the theft of his professional services in violation of Penal Code section 484. One struggles to understand how Clayton Brokerage, a licensed and regulated broker/dealer, could have cooperated in the con, but their representative at trial, Jack Friedman, admitted that they did. It is literally inconceivable how they could have ethically justified duping a business man into believing he had made millions! And not surprisingly, the illusion distorted Hunt's conduct and led him to make a series of unwise business decisions.

It is simple justice to lift the robbery allegation from Hunt's shoulders. Under the trial prosecutor's view of the facts, Hunt lacked the animus furandi of robbery as he had no intent to take Levin's property but rather only sought to recover a portion of what Levin publicly acknowledged was owed him. If a forcible taking took place, Levin, the brazen and unrepentant con artist, maliciously and wantonly drove what was then merely an ordinary citizen attempting to ply an honest trade to it. Remember, Levin exulted in being judgment-proof and laughed at people who sued him civilly. (3 RT 6696-6697.) He openly declared he was a thief by trade. (3 RT 6510, 6696-6698, 6727-6728; 4 RT 6866, 6879.)

Hunt's expectation that he would eventually receive \$4 million as his commission on the Clayton profits led him to believe he could avoid reporting trading losses to his other investors, as he would be able to make them whole when he obtained the funds from Levin.

Levin's and Clayton's conspiracy to defraud Hunt thus created the powerful motives that led to the fall of Hunt and the BBC. It is fair to say that Hunt would not be in prison today if he had not, first and repeatedly, been victimized by Levin.

So again, Petitioner points out that application of the claim of right doctrine, in light of the trial prosecutor's summation, is condign. It corrects a basic injustice.

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Hunt didn't want to take Levin's property. He was innocent of that mental state. DDA Wapner understood his evidence as proof that Hunt desperately wanted to obtain what was due him so that he could make his other investors whole.

The prosecutor convinced the jury that the Clayton travesty ended in Levin's murder, but under the State's theory at trial, it did not end in robbery as that crime was defined in 1984.

Had Hunt's jury been properly instructed, in light of the prosecutor's summation, the jury could only have acquitted Hunt of all theft and robbery based allegations, including the special circumstance of robbery.

The State of California has no legitimate interest in keeping Hunt under the weight of the special circumstance of robbery when it took the position at trial that he did not have the required mental state. The procedural questions connected to a claim of innocence are subsumed in the resolution of the underlying factual question. If Hunt is actually innocent of the animus furandi element of robbery, then for that very reason, the law of the state waves the related procedural questions. The State suffers no prejudice in the application of this rule as Hunt does not rely on new evidence nor seeks to reopen any evidentiary issue. Rather, he points to the trial record itself.

Although an intent to steal may ordinarily be inferred when one person takes the property of another, particularly if he takes it by force, proof of the existence of a state of mind incompatible with an intent to steal precludes a finding of either theft or robbery. (*People v. Butler* (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 573 (Butler).)¹ In this case, there was credible, substantial evidence supporting a claim of right defense. Hunt told everyone that Levin owed him \$3.5 to 4 million dollars from trades Hunt had made on behalf of Levin. (Exhibits, pp. 199-200, 203-206, 234, 241-242, 253, 268-269, 281-282, 287-288, 300, 355-357, 362-363, 365, 368-369, 379, 390-391, 393-394.) Indeed, in his closing argument, the prosecutor argued exactly this. (RT 12752-12753.)

¹ Although overruled in *People v. Tufunga* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, *Butler* is controlling in the instant case as the conduct preceded *Tufunga's* finality. (*People v. Sakarias* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 622.)

Based on the above there is no doubt that there was credible, substantial evidence that Hunt had a bona fide belief, even though mistakenly held, that he was owed \$3.5 million dollars by Levin for trading profits, however, the court did not give a jury instruction on a claim of right defense. Therefore, trial court's failure to instruct the jury of a claim of right defense to robbery "was a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of Article 13 of the California Constitution and requires reversal." (*Butler*, 65 Cal.2d at p. 572-574.)

CONCLUSION

Based on the above there is no doubt that the court should have instructed the jury on a claim of right defense as there was credible, substantial evidence that Hunt had a bona fide belief that he was owed far more money by Levin for trading profits, and the prosecutor's closing argument establishes the basis for such an instruction. Had the jury been properly instructed there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have convicted Hunt of robbery or found the robbery special circumstance true. Therefore, it is undeniable that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury of a claim of right defense to robbery was a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal.

Dated: October 18, 2023.

Respectfully submitted.

TRACY RENEE LUM

Counsel for Petitioner Joseph Hunt

In re Hunt, A090435

PROOF OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL

I, Scott Esty, declare:

I am a US citizen and over the age of 18. On the below date I have an electronic copy of the **PETITIONER'S REPLY TO INFORMAL RESPONSE**, on the parties as listed below:

Los Angeles County District Attorney Van C. Ha, Deputy District Attorney vha@da.lacounty.gov

SWORN TO UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, this 18th day of October, 2023 at Galt, California.

SCOTT ESTY, declarant

In re Hunt, A090435